Abstract-A number of systems have been developed for dynamic information flow control (IFC). In such systems, the security policy is expressed by labeling input and output channels; it is enforced by tracking and checking labels on data. Systems have been proven to enforce some form of noninterference (NI), formalized as a property of two runs of the program. In practice, NI is too strong and it is desirable to enforce some relaxation of NI that allows downgrading under constraints that have been classified as 'what', 'where', 'who', or 'when' policies. To encompass a broad range of policies, relational logic has been proposed as a means to specify and statically enforce policy. This paper shows how relational logic policies can be dynamically checked. To do so, we provide a new account of monitoring, in which the monitor state is viewed as an abstract interpretation of sets of pairs of program runs.
I. INTRODUCTION
Violations of information flow (IF) policies, such as using untrusted inputs without proper sanitization, can often be detected by means of data flow analysis. Such analysis can be done statically, though there is a tradeoff between soundness (catching all violations) and usability; sound analyses may produce many false positives due to conservative approximation. Dynamic analysis, or monitoring, costs runtime resources (e.g., for storage and propagation of labels), but it can be precise enough to avoid false positives. And it allows secure executions of imperfect programs. Unfortunately, data flow is the tip of the iceberg: an attacker wishing to avoid detection can exploit the flow of information via control (implicit flow), as well as various timing and other channels.
Information flow control (IFC) systems are designed to thwart implicit flows and, in some cases, other channels. In contrast with data flow analysis, IFC systems can provably enforce noninterference (NI) properties that are both mathematically precise and intuitively meaningful in connection with practical security requirements. Recent work demonstrates the possibility of dynamic IFC [1] , [2] , in particular for fine-grained policies that allow a program within a single thread and address space to manipulate information at multiple security levels. Unfortunately, there is a gap between the NI properties for which enforcement mechanisms are known and the security requirements which arise in practice.
Many policies both identify sensitive information and allow its downgrading under designated conditions. Untrusted input can be endorsed, i.e., trusted for certain purposes once it has been sanitized (e.g., used for SQL queries after being cleansed of embedded SQL fragments). Confidential information can be declassified, i.e., released for certain purposes once it has been suitably redacted, or anonymized, or is no longer timely. To provide a general way to express such IF policies, researchers have turned to forms of relational logic [3] , [4] . Such logics describe pairs of program runs, as usual in notions of NI. In addition to being able to describe indistinguishability relations between the two runs, such logics include ordinary assertions that refer to the program state. The program state often includes what is relevant for policy, e.g., whether a timer has expired or user credentials have been checked successfully. It is also possible to add instrumentation to facilitate formulation of policy; such "ghost code" is common practice in software verification and has been suggested as a way to augment type-based IF policy [5] .
We seek strong IFC for practical policies that involve downgrading. There are many challenges, such as how to obtain precise policy specifications and how to automate IFC for large software components. The specific problem that motivates this paper is how to design a runtime monitor to track policies expressed using relational logic. In a nutshell, our first contribution is a new relational logic with smallstep semantics, catering for intermediate assumptions and assertions to express policies concerning inputs and outputs. Our second contribution is to show how monitored execution can be viewed as abstracting over the set of alternate executions. Our third contribution is deriving the design of a monitor, along with its correctness proof, by refining the semantic description into an implementable form.
A. Policies in relational logic
One of the motivations for use of relational logic instead of other policy notations is that program logics can provide expressive and precise reasoning about data structures. For example, sensitive data can appear as subsegments of string buffers, or as nodes in linked data structures involving sharing or aliasing. Logics provide ways to designate the mutable locations to which fine-grained policies apply [6] , [4] . However, in order to focus on the main topics of this paper, we use a minimal imperative language.
An IFC system assumes that the designated secret variables/channels cannot be directly read and the designated trusted ones cannot be directly written by the adversary.
One technique for designating sensitive information is by labels used as types, or attached to types. For example, we could declare trusted out: trusted, untrusted out: untrusted, and hostname: untrusted. This is intended to express the integrity policy that trusted outputs are not influenced by untrusted inputs. Influence may be formalized in terms of pairs of executions: two runs that agree on (i.e., have the same values for) the trusted inputs should agree on the resulting trusted outputs. In the example below, varying the value of hostname should not affect the value of trusted out. Confidentiality policy is interpreted similarly: two runs that agree on public inputs should agree on the final value of public outputs, independent of secret inputs.
We now turn to examples of conditional downgrading policies which are not so easily expressed as types or labels, inspired by Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) [7] .
The first example, inspired by CWE-15, is an endorsement policy: the input hostname should affect the actual name of the host (represented by the trusted out channel) only if the password provided matches the root password. The policy is satisfied by this program:
input guess from public in input hostname from untrusted in input password from secret in if guess = password then output hostname to trusted out; else output "Access denied" to public out;
In relational logic, variables are designated "low" by the agreement operator A in pre-and post-conditions (written # and in [8] , [6] ). For example, the contract requires A x ensures A y expresses that any pair of runs that agree on the initial value of x should agree on the final value of y. We typically distinguish output variables from input variables; in that case the precondition expresses agreement on the low inputs and the postcondition expresses agreement on the low outputs. A practical syntax will provide defaults and syntax sugar, but in this paper we work directly with relational logic. In these terms we formalize the integrity policy as follows.
The both operator, B, is used to say that a state predicate holds in both runs. The precondition says that if public in = secret in is true in both runs then they agree on untrusted in. The postcondition says the runs agree on trusted out. The precondition A(public in = secret in) restricts attentions to pairs of runs that both do or both don't satisfy the equality of the guess and the password. A key point is that the implication in the precondition captures the policy in a way that directly refers to the program state. On the other hand, the policy specification is distinct from the executable code (which in practice might be idiomatic C).
The ability to express agreement for expressions is a key feature of relational logic. Specifications in the logic describe allowed dependency, which can capture both integrity and confidentiality policies. Next we consider a confidentiality policy in connection with the following undesirable code, inspired by CWE-204.
input user from public in; input guess from public in; input password from private in; if user != "root" then msg := "Incorrect username"; else if guess = password then msg := "Login successful"; else msg := "Incorrect authentication credentials"; output msg to public out;
We need to allow disclosing whether both the user name is found and the password matched, or not. But we should not allow disclosing partial matches -e.g., the user name was found, but the password didn't match-as it would lead to unnecessary disclosure. The following contract captures this requirement.
requires A (user = "root" ∧ guess = password) ensures A public out It can be read as saying that by observing public output, the adversary is allowed to learn the value of the expression (user = "root"∧guess = password). Consider two runs that agree on falsity but for different reasons: in one run the user isn't "root", in the other run the password is wrong. The specification requires agreement on the output, which does not happen with the code above.
Consider a variation of the policy where we instead require A(user = "root") ∧ A(guess = password). It says that by observing the public output the adversary is allowed to depend on ("learn") the value of user = "root" and also to depend on password = masterPassword. This policy is satisfied by the vulnerable program presented earlier. Writing good policies can be difficult but is beyond the scope of this paper.
So far we have used pre/post contracts to express policies, which keeps policy and code separate. However, contracts are not always practical. Consider C programs that perform memory allocations via malloc. We would like to write a conditional endorsement policy that guards against CWE-789 by restricting the allocation size coming from an untrusted source. There is no single contract for malloc that is suited to all its uses, and it is hard to give an end-to-end contract for a large program using it. Instead our specification uses an assertion just before the call: assert A size; pt := malloc(size);
Elsewhere in the code, following where the tainted value of size is obtained, we use assume A (size < 1000) ∧ (B (size < 1000) ⇒A size)
In general, an assumption following an input plays the role of a requires clause, and an assertion preceding an output plays the role of an ensures. Contracts amount to an initial assumption and a final assertion, so we do not formalize contracts as such.
As another example, recent cross-site scripting vulnerabilities in several Apache modules [9] can be prevented by requiring all untrusted inputs to be sanitized before sending to the client. In one such policy, we use assume A html escape (servername) following the input of servername. Much later in the code, where the server name -supposed to have been sanitizedis be written to an output buffer, we use assert A buffer.
B. Monitoring
Several recent works present monitor designs for idealized languages, in which labels designate sensitive values and facilitate tracking of information. In many settings, including low-level LLVM code that is a focus of our project, it is important for labeling to be flow-sensitive; a memory location may hold secrets at one moment and public information at another. To avoid the cost and conservativity of static analysis, while allowing some flow sensitivity, purely dynamic monitoring is attractive [10] . There are tradeoffs between what can be achieved by purely dynamic monitoring versus hybrid monitors that rely on static analysis for branches not taken [1] . More related work is discussed in Sec. VI. Few of these works on monitoring address any form of downgrading. The most closely related work is by Askarov and Sabelfeld [11] who provide a flow-insensitive monitor that caters to declassification policies expressed by declass statements as featured in Jif [12] . We seek to monitor rich policies and idiomatic code, where the downgrading may be performed by code different from the policy expression. For example, declassify h0+h1 by t:=h0; pubout:=t+h1.
The works cited above all provide correctness proofs with respect to precisely defined security properties. One challenge is to formulate a security property such that downgrading policies are interpreted in accord with intended requirements [13] . That is not the focus of this paper. Rather, we pursue the ideal that a correctness proof should provide a compelling explanation for the monitor design, so that theory could guide the design of practical monitors for production use. To date it is not easy to discern the commonalities and general principles among published proofs, or even the security properties.
That said, there are some basic features found in published security properties and correctness proofs, not only for monitors but also for static analyses. Security is described in terms of two executions, which are assumed to agree on low input events and must be shown to agree on low outputs. This is proved in terms of a more fine-grained property in which segments of a computation are classified as low or high contexts in accord with information in branch conditions. Low segments of the two computations are aligned in lockstep, whereas high segments may differ between the two executions but an agreement invariant is maintained (cf. "unwinding conditions"). While such correspondence is implicit in proofs based on bisimulation and the like, it is made explicit and called alignment by Kovács et al [14] who present a static analysis based on abstract interpretation of pairs of executions. A key point, as they discuss, is that existence of a good alignment suffices to prove NI, whereas refuting NI would require reasoning about all possible alignments. The choice of alignment is manifest in syntax in the works on static verification by self-composition [15] , [16] .
C. Overview and contributions
A monitor has to work on a single run, which we call the major trace following [17] . The monitor's instrumentation somehow tracks what could happen in alternate runs, called minor traces. The main idea explored in this paper is that at each step the monitor state is an abstract representation of all possible minor traces consistent with the major trace. This representation must be such that it can be maintained as the computation proceeds. In this view, a monitor can allow a step of execution provided it can ensure that the chosen alignment(s) for every minor computation can be extended. When a monitoring rule requires raising a security error, it is because for some alternate run the chosen alignment cannot be extended in a way that maintains the agreement relation. This may be because the policy is indeed violated -in which case no alignment exists with the desired propertyor because the chosen alignment is not one that can be used to establish NI for these runs. The latter case is a mechanism failure. Some mechanism failures are inevitable for a sound monitor. However, we aim for effective runtime reasoning about policy, e.g., leveraging runtime checking for ordinary assertions.
Section II lays the groundwork to explore our new view of monitoring: a simple programming language, and relational formulas for use in assumptions and assertions. Sec. III introduces a novel small-step semantics for relational specifications. To this end we introduce a novel classification of pairs of traces: some conform to the policy, some are irrelevant (because they diverge or violate assumptions), and some are failures because they violate assertions or cannot be aligned. A program is secure with respect to its specification if it admits no assertion failures. Roughly, this generalizes knowledge-based security properties like [18] , [11] .
In Sec. V we describe the job of a monitor as maintaining a tracking set for the major trace, i.e., an abstraction of the set of all possible minor traces, together with their classification. If there are any failures, the monitor should announce that the trace is unsafe.
For a monitor to track all minor traces it must be able to track an arbitrary one. In Sec. IV we define what a tracking should look like, for the various classifications. We show how the usual monitor apparatus -labels on locations, plus a stack of security levels-describes the tracking of a minor trace, and we show how it can be updated as the major trace progresses. This provides a rational reconstruction of extant monitors. The monitor's transition relation can be defined in terms of the monitor state and underlying program configuration, independent of the minor trace. Hence the tracking set, of which the monitor state is an abstraction, can be maintained pointwise. Monitor transitions play the role of "transfer function" in the theory of abstract interpretation [19] .
Because our policies are expressed in terms of assertions and assumptions, the usual monitor apparatus is not enough. We add one more component to the monitor state: a set of formulas known to hold for aligned pairs of configurations. By proving that this invariant can be maintained as the major trace grows (Thm. 7 in Sec. IV-B), we effectively derive a monitor that makes use of assumptions about inputs in checking assertions about outputs.
We find it remarkable that by describing monitoring as a kind of abstract interpretation, the actions of the monitor can be determined hand in hand with the explanation why it works correctly. We leave it to the reader to make the comparison with correctness proofs found in related works (often lengthy unpublished appendices).
1 But this paper is just a first step. Sec. VII discusses questions about our approach that need further investigation. A key goal is to formalize an abstraction function according to the theory of abstract interpretation, and to "turn the crank" for a formal derivation of the monitor. Work of this kind is included under related work, Sec. VI. We challenge ourselves and others to see whether the approach helps in the design and implementation of monitors for practical programming languages and deployment environments.
II. BACKGROUND
Section II-A defines a small-step operational semantics for simple imperative programs, the basis for our formal development. Sec. II-B defines a relational assertion language to be used for policies expressed in the assertion and assumption commands. The following Sec. III formalizes the security property in these terms.
A. Programming Language
Simple imperative language with annotation commands
integer expr. e ::= tt | ff | x | e = e | e ≤ e | e ∧ e | ¬e boolean expr. c ::
Variables are assumed to have a fixed type, either integer or boolean. Expressions are required to be type-correct. We eschew formalizing the typing of expressions and commands. Relational formulas Φ are defined in the sequel. Tags serve to make occurrences of annotation commands unique and may be elided when there is no ambiguity. For brevity we use the term annotation rather than "annotation command".
The small-step semantics is very standard. Configurations take the form c, σ where c is a command and σ a state. Let code c, σ be c and state c, σ be σ. A state is a mapping from variables to their values, which are integers or booleans. Henceforth, σ and τ range over states. We write σ(e) for the value of expression e in state σ, and assume that expressions are defined in all states. We write [σ|x : v] for the updated state that maps x to v. In concrete examples we write states like [x : 2, y : tt].
Transition rules for commands
Programs are deterministic and annotations have no effect.
Trace notations
A trace is a finite non-empty sequence of configurations that is consecutive under the transition relation. Let T, U, V range over traces. We write sequences by catenation 2 and refer to the length as |T |. We also treat sequences as functions from an initial segment of the naturals. So T 0 is the first configuration and dom(T ) is the set of indices 0, . . . , |T |−1. Write last(T ) for T |T |−1 . Write T i for the first i elements of T , i.e., the prefix up to but not including the element T i . Write T ≥ T to say T is a prefix of T . An example trace: assumeΦ; assertΨ, σ skip; assertΨ, σ assertΨ, σ skip, σ .
We assume any considered program c is well formed in the sense of being type-correct, a property that is preserved by the transition relation. We also assume that in any initial configuration c, σ considered, (a) no annotation tag occurs more than once in c, and (b) c has the form b; skip for some b. In a more concrete semantics, instead of tags we would use program points; tagged syntax caters for use of structural operational semantics. The transition rule for while duplicates the loop body, so tags are not necessarily unique in non-initial configurations. Item (b) loses no generality and helps reduce the number of cases to be considered in some proofs. For the same reason, we have chosen to make if/then the only branching transition. We gloss over (b) in examples.
In Sec. IV and V we restrict attention to programs of the form assumeΦ; c; skip.
Configurations 
B. Relational formulas
Relational assertions amount to assertions on a pair of states, so any first order language can be adapted to a language of relational formulas. However, we are concerned with relations that connect the two states by equalitiesagreements.
Relational formulas Φ for annotations
ϕ ::= e | ϕ ∨ ϕ | ¬ϕ | ∀x.ϕ unary formula Φ ::= Ae | Bϕ | Bϕ ⇒ Ae basic relational formula Φ ::= Φ ∧ Φ conjunction
of basic formulas
Unary formulas ϕ are ordinary first order formulas; the atomic formulas are boolean expressions of the programming language, and formulas are evaluated in a single state. Relational formulas, ranged over by the letters Φ and Ψ, are evaluated in a pair of states. Relational formulas feature conditional agreements, Bϕ ⇒ Ae, that require both states to agree on the value of e if ϕ holds in both states. Reasoning about conditional agreements is facilitated by square relations of the form Bϕ. An unconditional agreement Ae is equivalent to Btt ⇒ Ae.
We use standard semantics for first order formulas: σ |= ϕ means ϕ is true in state σ and |= indicates that it is false. Note that σ |= e iff σ(e) = tt, for boolean expression e.
Semantics of relational formulas
Free variables (F V ) are defined in the standard way.
To define the monitor semantics, we work with extended relational formulas of the form Φ ⇒ Ψ where Ψ may be Aϕ or a basic relational formula; and also simply Aϕ. For extended relational formulas, the semantics is defined as the notation suggests: σ|τ |= Aϕ means that σ |= ϕ iff τ |= ϕ.
And σ|τ |= Φ ⇒ Ψ means that either σ|τ |= Φ or σ|τ |= Ψ. We write |= Φ ⇒ Ψ to indicate that the implication is valid, i.e., σ|τ |= Φ ⇒ Ψ for all σ, τ .
III. SMALL-STEP RELATIONAL LOGIC
To enable use of intermediate assertions and assumptions to express downgrading policies, we introduce a novel smallstep notion of relational correctness. Its formulation caters for the abstract interpretation described in subsequent sections of the paper, and for termination-insensitive security. We define what it means for a trace to be safe. A program is secure, i.e., correct with respect to its specification, iff all its traces are safe.
Alignment, proper alignment, coverage
is monotone, i.e., ∀i, j, k, l with iαj and kαl, i < k ⇒ j ≤ l and j < l ⇒ i ≤ k; and (b) has prefix-closed domain and range, i.e., i ∈ dom(α) (resp. rng(α)) and 0 ≤ j < i imply j ∈ dom(α) (resp.
rng(α)).
A proper alignment from T to U is an alignment α such that for all i, j with iαj, if either redex(
For α to cover the major trace (resp. the minor trace) means that dom(α) = dom(T ) (resp. rng(α) = dom(U )).
Aligned annotations have the same identifying tag, not just the same formula. Also, in a proper alignment that covers both traces, if one trace has executed an annotation command then the other has too. To be precise: Lemma 3. Let α be a proper alignment that covers both T and U . Suppose iαj and redex(T i ) is an annotation. Then
In general, proper alignments are not unique. As an illustration, consider two traces of a program assumeAy; x:= y; assertAx which differ only in starting states. Two (of several) possible proper alignments for the two traces are shown in Fig. 1 , where commands assumeΨ and assertΨ are abbreviated as [Ψ] and {Ψ} respectively.
The following notions classify the ways in which a minor trace U may relate to a major trace T . On first reading it may be helpful to think about a command of the form assumeΦ; c; assertΨ where c has no annotations. 
Classification of aligned trace pairs
An aligned trace pair is a triple (T, U, α) where α is a proper alignment from T to U . A conformance is an aligned trace pair (T, U, α) where α covers both T and U , and for all i, j, if iαj, i < |T | − 1, and redex(T i ) asserts or assumes Φ then
An assumption failure is (T, U, α) where there are
An assertion failure is the same as an assumption failure, except that redex
An alignment failure is (T, U, α) where there is i, i < |T |, such that redex(T i ) is an annotation command, (T i, U, α) is a conformance, and there is U > U such that either last(U ) is terminated or redex(last(U )) is an annotation different from redex(T i ), and no proper prefix of U extends U and matches redex(T i ).
A divergence failure is (T, U, α) where there is i, i < |T |, such that redex(T i ) is an annotation command, (T i, U, α) is a conformance, and there are infinitely many U ≥ U , none of which has redex(last(U )) = redex(T i ).
The idea is that a computation T is secure if there are no alternate traces resulting in assertion or alignment failure. Assumption failures generalize preconditions, ruling out some traces as not being of interest. We consider divergence failures benign, which embodies the decision to focus on termination-insensitive security properties.
Conformance allows the traces to end with an aligned annotation that has not been executed and whose formula may not hold. Note that (i − 1)α(j − 1) implies 0 < i and 0 < j.
For assumption failure, the redex of the last configuration in T i (and in U j) is the assumption. This fits with the definition of conformance, which does not constrain an unexecuted assumption. Note also that T and U may continue past i, j. Finally, instead of T i |U j |= Φ we could as well write T i−1 |U j−i |= Φ as the transition for an assumption does not change the state. Observe that, similar to proper alignments in general, conformances are not unique. Both alignments presented in figure 1 are indeed conformances because they are proper and they happen to satisfy the assertions and assumptions at trace points (0, 0) and (4, 4).
To illustrate assertion failures, we will slightly modify our running example by removing x:=y. In this example the alignment is unique. If both traces hadn't made the last step the alignment would have been considered a conformance.
[ Fig. 2 illustrates alignment failure. Alignment failure for an assumption would indicate implicit flow into a downgrading, which is considered bad policy. Our security property enforces one aspect of robust declassification [20] , [11] , which allows a low observer to learn from the declassified value but not from the fact that a declassification has occurred.
Safe trace
Let c be a command and T a trace of c. The trace T is safe iff for every state σ there is a trace U from c, σ and alignment α from T to U such that (T, U, α) is a conformance, an assumption failure, or a divergence failure.
Recall that typical security properties quantify over states σ that are low-equivalent to state(T 0 ), whereas here we quantify over all σ. That works because the policy is intended to be expressed by an initial assumption that serves to define low equivalence. Low-equivalence in final states can be designated by a final assertion. Suppose the program has an initial assumption and a final assertion, both conjunctions of agreements on variables. If there are no other annotations, safety is exactly the standard notion of termination-insensitive NI.
In the definition of safety, σ may be instantiated by state(T 0 ). Say T has a unary assertion failure if it reaches d, τ where redex(d) is assert Bϕ ∧ . . . and τ |= ϕ. If (T, T, id dom(T ) ) is a conformance then T is free of unary assertion failures. Thus, insofar as the program has assertions of the form Bϕ, our notion of security includes absence of unary assertion failures.
To conclude this section, the following Theorem says that the trace classification is exhaustive. Its proof foreshadows subsequent proofs which lead us to monitoring, and it motivates details in the classification of aligned trace pairs. In case redex(d) is not an annotation, we go by cases on redex(last(V )).
• If redex(last(V )) is assume Φ, then by proper alignment we have redex(last(U )) = redex(last(V )) and
is a conformance; otherwise it is an assumption failure.
• In case is assert Φ, we proceed as in the preceding case, but instead of an assumption failure or conformance we get assertion failure or conformance.
• In case redex(last(V )) is not an annotation, let α be
is not an annotation, so α is a proper alignment from V d, τ to U , and (V d, τ , U , α ) is a conformance. Owing to Lemma 1, these are the only cases.
IV. HOW TO TRACK AN ALIGNED MINOR TRACE
For a given major trace, a static analysis or runtime monitor will attempt to find alignments that witness the existence of minor trace U and α in the definition of safety; and it will attempt to check assertions, given the preceding assumptions. These attempts may fail. When a monitor raises a security exception, it means the monitor is no longer able to ensure that execution is secure. We use the term mechanism failure for these.
This section considers what a monitor might do with respect to a single minor trace. To figure out how the monitor should work, we give constructive proofs of two results that strengthen Thm. 5. The second proof essentially defines a monitor, in the sense that the construction does not refer to the minor trace. This means that the monitor is effectively tracking all minor traces, as we spell out in Sec. V.
In the rest of the paper we require all programs to take the form assume Φ; c. The assumption is needed in order to determine sensible initialization for the monitor state.
A. Strong conformances
We introduce some ingredients one would expect in a hybrid monitor. The first step adds augmentation, similar to that in the monitors of [21] , [1] , that allows us to define the particular alignments of interest. The second step, in Sec. IV-B, makes better use of annotation. We also use a rudimentary static analysis: let targets(c) be the set of variables that occur on the left side of assignments in c.
Augmented configuration
An augmented configuration is c, σ, λ, π where the variable levels are a map λ : Vars → {lo, hi} and the program counter level π is either the token lo or a tuple (hi, stk) where stk is a non-empty list of pairs (b, c) of commands. Some notations:
An augmented trace is a sequence of augmented configurations whose erasure is a trace (i.e., consecutive under transitions →).
The idea is that in a trace segment where the context is high, i.e., π = (hi, (b, c) : rest) the command c is the "low continuation" that represents the control flow join point and the command b is the branch not taken in the major trace (which provides for static analysis). It is for c to always exist that we need the trailing skip in initial configurations. A stack is needed to handle programs like this: if h > 0 then (if h > 1 then m := 0 else skip) else n := 0 Consider trace T from initial state with h = 1, versus minor trace from a state with h = 2. The minor trace follows the same top level path, but not the same inner path.
The notions of alignment, conformance, and failure are carried over to aligned pairs (T, U, α) where T is a trace of augmented configurations and U a trace of ordinary configurations.
Strong conformance
A strong conformance is a conformance (T, U, α) such that T is an augmented trace and the following hold for all i, j with iαj.
(a) if i > 0 and j > 0 then We next strengthen Thm. 5 to strong conformances. The decision to incrementally extend a single alignment, rather than search among possible alignments, is obvious from an algorithmic point of view but it comes at the price of approximation. A chosen alignment may not be extendable yet another may exist. For example, in two runs of the program in Fig. 2 , if both follow the true branch there will be a proper alignment, but if the monitor treats the conditional as a high context then that alignment will not be found. In practical terms, the situations where this may arise can be seen as poorly chosen policies.
The obvious thing to do is introduce a notion of mechanism failure: an aligned trace pair (T, U, α) where (T i, U, α) is a conformance, for some i. A property like Thm. 5 but allowing mechanism failure is essentially vacuous. What one would hope for is constraints on the circumstances under which we declare mechanism failure.
In this paper we do not formalize such constraints (nor have we found that done in prior work). Instead we focus on deriving a sensible monitor. We appeal to mechanism failure only where it seems unavoidable.
Safety now means absence of mechanism failure, alignment failure, and assertion failure. A difficulty is how to ignore divergence failures. As defined in Sec. III, such a failure occurs at the point when the major trace reaches an annotation. In reasoning about strong conformance, however, we need to consider the possibility of divergence of the minor run at the join points of high branches.
Eventual divergence failure, quiescent conformance (T, U, α) is an eventual divergence failure if it is a (strong) conformance and there is some T ≥ T such that (T , U, α)
is a divergence failure.
(T, U, α) is a quiescent conformance if it is a (strong) conformance and there does not exist any T ≥ T such that redex(last(T )) is an annotation.
A divergence failure is a special case of eventual divergence failure. For termination-insensitive security it makes sense to ignore eventual divergence failures. The point of quiescent conformance is that further execution of the major trace cannot lead to assertion or alignment failure and so need not be considered a violation of safety. We sketch the induction step, for the interesting case where conformance holds so far. Suppose (T, U, α) is a strong conformance. Suppose last(T ) is c, σ, λ, π and c, σ → c , σ . We must find λ , π , U , α such that (T c , σ , λ , π , U , α ) is either a strong conformance or one of the failure forms. We go by cases on π.
In case π = lo we go by cases on redex(c): (T c , σ , λ, π , U, α) is deemed to be a mechanism failure (though it may well be leading to an alignment failure). assumeΨ : Same as assert.
B. Tracking known formulas
The construction in the preceding proof is interesting because determining new values λ , π for the variable levels and program counter, and determining whether there is some kind of failure, is based largely on the current configuration of the major trace. It does refer to the minor trace to evaluate asserted and assumed formulas. But the minor trace is a semantic artifact with which to reason about information flow -a monitor will have no access to the minor trace. Our next step eliminates that, and improves the treatment of λ and π by taking advantage of assumptions and assertions.
Consider as an example the fragment assume A (h0 + h1); x := h1 + h0; assert A x in a low context, where the initial λ has λ(h0) = hi and λ(h1) = hi. According to the proof of Thm 6, the final levels λ will have λ (x) = hi, but if there is no assumption failure then the two traces will agree on x. Update of the levels needs to take into account the assumption. There is a similar issue for if/then: In a low context, determination of whether an if/then initiates a high context is based on whether the two traces agree on the guard expression e. Rather than simply checking whether λ(e) = lo, it would be better to take prior assumptions into account, for example, when e is h0+h1>0 following the assumption A(h0 + h1).
Fully augmented configuration, full conformance
A fully augmented configuration takes the form c, σ, λ, π, Δ where λ and π are as in an augmented configuration and Δ is a set of basic relational formulas.
A full conformance is a strong conformance (T, U, α) where T is a trace of fully augmented configurations and
The set Δ is interpreted conjunctively, so we may treat Δ as a formula, and we write σ|τ |= Δ to mean σ|τ |= Φ for every Φ in Δ.
One could dispense with λ, by including in Δ the formula Ax, for each x with λ(x) = lo. We retain λ, both for clarity and because in an implementation the two sorts of information may best have different representations.
For an assignment x := e in a low context, λ (x) can be lo if |= Aλ ∧ Δ ⇒ Ae. (Recall that Aλ abbreviates a conjunction of variable agreements Ax, Ay, . . . , Az where x, y, . . . z are the low variables according to λ.) Note that the condition |= Aλ ∧ Δ ⇒ Ae refers to validity of the formula, rather than its truth in the current states -information about the current states is provided by λ and Δ. This condition also serves for determining whether there is agreement on the guard expression of an if/then.
The next question is how to check annotations, i.e., how to determine whether c, σ, λ, π, Δ | c , σ |= Ψ without looking at σ . In addition to appealing to the full conformance condition σ|σ |= Aλ ∧ Δ, it is possible to check unary assertions in the major trace. There are interesting connections between unary and relational assertions. For example, B(x = 0) implies Ax, and more generally Bϕ for any ϕ that implies a specific value for x. Also σ |= ϕ and σ|τ |= Aϕ imply τ |= ϕ. These considerations suggest that it could be useful to know the strongest invariant at each program point; approximations can be obtained by static analysis. An appropriate interface to the monitor would be to provide this information in the form of designated assumptions, as we discuss in Sec. V. Assertions are checked, not trusted by our monitor, but it remembers the results from successful checks.
The monitor can rely on functions that approximate checks of truth and validity, specified as follows.
Specification of truth and validity checkers
For eval, a particularly simple implementation is the program semantics: let eval(σ, e) = tt if σ(e) = tt, for boolean expression e, and eval(σ, ϕ) = unknown otherwise.
For chkVal , we will be particularly interested in checks where the antecedent includes the variable agreements given by Aλ. We sketch a simple implementation that caters for this.
The truth and validity checkers are used by the following function. It approximates the checking of σ|τ |= Φ, with σ explicitly given but τ known only to be related according to λ and Δ.
More sophisticated implementations are possible, including ones that take advantage of guardedness. This refers to formulas like Ae ∧ (Be ⇒ Ae ), as in examples in Sec. I-A.
Theorem 7. For any command c and initial states σ and τ , any trace of c from σ can be augmented to a trace T such that there is an ordinary trace U of c from τ , and an alignment α, such that (T, U, α) is either a full conformance or one of the forms of failure, including eventual divergence and quiescent conformance.
Proof: By induction on the given trace. The base cases are the same as in the proof of Thm. 6, with the addition that Δ 0 , in the first configuration of the major trace, is ∅. The second configuration's Δ is Ψ where the initial assumption of c is Ψ.
For the induction step to longer major traces, suppose (T, U, α) is a full conformance. Suppose last(T ) is c, σ, λ, π, Δ and c, σ → c , σ . We must find λ , π , Δ , U , α such that (T c , σ , λ , π , Δ , U , α ) is either a full conformance or one of the failure forms. By cases on redex(c) and cases on whether π is lo. In case π = lo we go by cases on redex(c):
x := e : As in the proof of Thm. 6, we let π := lo,
Owing to Lemma 2 we have σ|τ |= Δ . Let λ := [λ|x : l] where l is lo if either λ(e) = lo or chkVal (Aλ ∧ Δ ⇒ Ae) = tt. (With stronger assumptions on chkVal , there would be no need for checking λ(e) = lo.)
failure Table I  MONITORING 
Either way, the rest goes as in Thm. 6 . if e then c tt else c ff : As in Thm. 6, adding Δ := Δ. assertΨ : As in Thm. 6. assumeΨ : As in Thm. 6.
The constructive part of the proof can be summarized in the form of monitoring rules, given in Table I. The table  defines transition The initial value of π is lo. The initial values of λ and Δ are obtained from the first assumption in the program. Specifically, we stipulate that any program should look like: assumeΨ; c; skip for some Ψ and c. Then, the initial value of Δ is going to be Ψ (treated as a set of basic formulas) and the initial value of λ such that |= Ψ ⇒ Aλ. A simple example of a monitored execution is presented in Fig. 3 . The preceding section considered how a single minor run can be tracked by a major run equipped with suitable instrumentation. However, the use and update of instrumentation is independent of the particular minor run. This is the key to monitoring: the monitor computes an abstraction of the set of possible minor traces.
It is convenient to use the following tokens to represent the classification of trace alignments: ignore, fail , ok.
Tracking sets
A tagged minor trace for T is a quadruple (T, U, α, tag) such that code(T ) = code(U ) and (a) if tag is ignore, (T, U, α) is an assumption failure, eventual divergence, or quiescent conformance; (b) if tag is fail , (T, U, α) is as assertion failure, alignment failure, or designated as a mechanism failure; and (c) if tag is ok then (T, U, α) is a full conformance.
A tracking set for T is a set X of tagged minor traces for T with the following properties.
(Completeness) For all σ, there is some
We include state(T 0 ) among the states σ: As discussed earlier, the monitor is checking ordinary unary assertion failures too.
Here is an immediate consequence of the definitions.
Theorem 8. If X is a tracking set for T and X does not contain the tag fail then T is safe (i.e., T is safe).
To determine the safety of a trace T it suffices to maintain a tracking set. This can be done by pointwise updates, owing to the construction in Theorems 6 and 7. For the induction step consider a trace V c, σ . By induction, let T and X be the fully augmented trace and tracking set for V . Extend T and each tagged minor trace in X according to the construction in the proof of Thm. 7, choosing the appropriate tag in each case. Note that extension of T is determined entirely by the current configuration, independent of any minor trace (Table I ). In some cases it is unknown, "from the monitor's point of view", which kind of failure occurs, but it is always determined which tag applies.
Monitoring: Having determined how the monitor tracks minor traces, what remains is to decide how it should handle failure. One possibility is to maintain a boolean flag, initially true and set false if failure reached. The major trace is secure so long as the flag is true. For strong security, the computation should be halted if failure is reached. Simply logging the failure may be appropriate for software testing. Failures may hint at faulty policy, or the need for additional assumptions to facilitate reasoning by the monitor.
The monitor is evidently transparent, in the sense that it does not alter the program behavior except for whatever action is taken upon failure. However, a safe trace may be considered as a failure, due to choice of alignment as well as incompleteness of assertion checking.
What about multi-level policies? In the relational logic approach to information flow policy, such policies are expressed by using multiple relational specifications. One may also want multiple policies because there are multiple requirements. In our setting, one could choose for annotation labels pairs (p, n) where p is a policy identifier and n provides uniqueness. A program may have many annotations, all with unique labels but several may share a given policy name p. For each p there can be a monitor based on the annotations for p, ignoring the other annotations. The cartesian product of these monitors enforces all the policies. There are obvious optimizations of the product monitor, e.g., the product of several λ functions can be represented by a single one that maps to a product lattice instead of {lo, hi}.
Static and dynamic reasoning about annotations:
Here is an example of how the monitor does some reasoning. When the branch is taken, the intermediate assertion is in a low context (owing to the initial assumption). It checks successfully, because guess = password holds in the current state and the monitor still knows the agreement A (guess = password). For the assignment, the monitor determines the label on untrusted can be set to lo, because from B (guess = password) and the initial assumption it knows A untrusted.
Here is an example where hybrid monitoring can benefit from static assertion checking.
assume A (h0+h1) ∧ A (h2+h3) x02 := h0 + h2; x13 := h1 + h3; y := x02; y := y + x13; assert B (y = h0 + h1 + h2 + h3); out := y; assert A out Semantically, both assertions are valid. In fact the intermediate assertion can be established by a rudimentary unary program verifier, and for any valid unary assertion ϕ the assertion Bϕ is valid in relational logic. The monitor presented here cannot establish the first assertion: Although it can test y = h0 + h1 + h2 + h3 in the current state, and it can deduce A (h0 + h1 + h2 + h3) from the initial assumption, it cannot deduce A y.
The point of the example is that, although prior "hybrid" monitors used static analysis to determine potentially updated state, another useful form of static analysis is ordinary assertion checking. In this case, that justifies assuming B(y = h0 + h1 + h2 + h3), which then serves to inform the monitor about the current value of y so that it can deduce the agreement and thereby confirm the final assertion. One can also use assumptions in this way for statically checked relational assertions. Of course such assumptions should be distinguished from those that are part of the policy specification.
Another policy issue is that, for some end-to-end security properties, it is important to disallow mutation of variables that occur in downgrading policy assumptions. For the monitor to track whether a given location has been assigned or still has its initial value, one can add "old-expressions" to the assertion language, for use in assertions like x = old(x). Old-expressions have been implemented in several runtime assertion checkers [22] .
VI. RELATED WORK
Relational logic for specification of information flow has been introduced by Benton [23] and Amtoft and Banerjee [8] for simple imperative programs. Hunt and Sands [24] provide a flow-sensitive type system that is equivalent. Amtoft et al [6] extend the logic to object-based programs by means of a region-based heap abstraction, so agreements can be expressed for heap locations. Their idea inspired development of region logic [25] , a relational version of which is work in progress. Amtoft et al [26] implement relational contracts for SparkAda procedures, which can express conditional agreements for array segments, including generation of verification conditions using relational loop invariants. To specify policies involving multiple levels they introduce indexed agreements which compactly encode multiple requires/ensures contracts. Nanevski et al [4] design and implement Relational Hoare Type Theory, providing machine-checked static verification of relational policies for program features including dynamic allocation and deallocation. Their policies are less expressive than ours insofar as they only provide pre/post contracts. On the other hand, their relations are expressed using full higher order logic; in particular, this provides for an unusual notion of declassification based on opacity of abstract predicates.
Banerjee et al [18] propose a mix of relational logic and type checking to express policies with declassification, extending the end-to-end property of [27] . Another extension that addresses the "what" and "where" dimensions of declassification is given in [11] . We conjecture that by choosing a suitable class of annotations in our relational logic, we can obtain their security properties as consequence of our semantics in Sec. III.
The idea of making alignments an explicit structure, with a minor run constructed incrementally appeared in [18] where it was used for soundness proof of their static analysis. Kovács et al. [14] formulate and implement abstract interpretation of trace pairs; we adopt their term "alignments". Their algorithm checks pre/post properties. They construct alignments from trace pairs by automatic syntactic matching. In contrast, works like [16] , [15] use static analysis and transformation to construct a syntactic representation that determines the alignment for all pairs.
The extra components in augmented configurations (our λ and π) have been used in existing information flow monitors [1] , [21] , [28] , [2] , [17] , [10] , [29] , [11] . Trace alignments are not explicit in prior work on monitoring, except for [2] which has hinted at their existence, calling them "trace pairs": "corresponding" elements of two traces where one of the elements might not exist, and the pairing is according to program counter values explicit in traces.
The idea of a "hybrid" monitor that uses static analysis to account for indirect implicit flows when control flow merges goes back to [2] and [21] . However, as shown in [1] , the former did not need to be hybrid after all, due to being flow-insensitive. Moore and Chong [30] adapt the monitor of [1] to programs that dynamically allocate state, showing what sorts of heap abstraction can support hybrid monitoring. Beringer [17] delves into the design of flow-sensitive monitors, dissecting the components of hybrid monitors dealing with direct and aspects of indirect flow, studying the guarantees given by variations on existing enforcement mechanisms. He coined the terms "minor" and "major" which we use.
Most of the previous work on monitoring was concerned with plain NI policies. Askarov and Sabelfeld's [11] stands out as the only one, to the best of our knowledge, to address declassification policies. The monitor carries around a set E declassified expressions, which at first glance resembles our Δ. But the monitor's behavior is not affected by E; it only serves as ghost instrumentation with which to define the security property, an end-to-end knowledge based property like those of [18] , [11] , [31] . Because policy expression is conflated with the release action, the monitor can just execute the declass as an assignment (and add the expression to E). Agreement on the values of released expressions is in the initial memory rather than the current one. Owing to the flexibility of relational logic, their security property can be expressed in our setting by judicious choice of policy including specification of which variables can be modified. Birgisson et al [32] observe that many integrity policies simply require invariance of a predicate or value. They augment the monitor of [11] to check an ordinary assertion upon termination (effectively using old-expressions).
Our treatment of assumptions and assertions resembles the security property used by Dupressoir et al [33] for (unary) reasoning about protocol implementations. Flow-locks [5] extend information-flow typing with state-dependent conditions. Austin et al [34] describe dynamic IFC for imperative programs by translation to a lambda calculus. Secure multiexecution [35] , [36] and faceted execution [37] are being explored as alternatives to monitoring by label-tracking.
VII. DISCUSSION
The connection made here between information flow monitoring and relational program logic is just a beginning, which points to many topics for further investigation. In ongoing work we are developing an inlined monitor for the LLVM intermediate representation that implements the design described in this paper. This involves a richer assertion language to deal with arrays and buffered streams. We are also exploring how to make a hybrid monitor tunable in terms of how much it relies on static analysis, including verification of assertions, prior to execution. We can also tune the performance/completeness tradeoff for runtime reasoning (eval and chkVal ). A useful feature is detection of inconsistent assumptions. from concrete semantics together with an abstraction function [19] , [38] . Unlike these works, however, we are dealing with a hyperproperty so the concrete domain and abstraction function are somewhat complicated. We leave this to future work, aiming to build on the work of Kovács et al [14] .
There has been other work on abstract interpretation for information flow and even declassification, but using abstractions of single executions [39] . A general framework could facilitate investigation of alternate monitoring techniques such as fully dynamic monitoring [10] , [40] .
One should also investigate relationships among different security properties and how they may or may not be expressible in our relational logic or a variation of it to cater for termination-sensitive security properties. Our development leans heavily on determinacy, so nondeterminacy is a particularly interesting challenge.
